Bargaining, Compensating Wage Differentials, and Dualism of the Labor Market: Theory and Evidence from France

TitreBargaining, Compensating Wage Differentials, and Dualism of the Labor Market: Theory and Evidence from France
Type de publicationArticle de revue
AuteurDaniel, Christophe , Sofer, Catherine
PaysEtats-Unis
EditeurUniversity of Chicago Press
VilleChicago
TypeArticle scientifique dans une revue à comité de lecture
Année1998
LangueAnglais
Numéro3
Pagination546-575
Volume16
Titre de la revueJournal of Labor Economics
ISSN0734-306X
Mots-clésCompensating wage differentials, Union bargaining, working conditions
Résumé en anglais

The theory of compensating differentials predicts a negative relationship between wages and good working conditions, while the theory of segmentation predicts a positive one. Combining the hedonic wage model and the wages‐employment collective bargaining model, we show the relevance of a further factor: a union power effect. Then we test the validity of this effect with French cross‐section data. Empirical results confirm the predictions of the model, that is, the coexistence of a negative relationship between wages and good working conditions for the whole sample (market effect) and a positive relationship in highly unionized sectors (union power effect).

URL de la noticehttp://okina.univ-angers.fr/publications/ua14691
DOI10.1086/209898
Lien vers le document

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/209898